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ARGUMENT
A.

The Appellees improperly raise arguments for the first time on appeal.

Procedurally, an appellate court is bound by the arguments and decisions made in the
lower court. See State p. Lope^ 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). Only those issues ripe for
appeal may be argued before an appellate court. Appellee/Intervenor Utah Transit Authority
("UTA") argues in its own Brief that an appellate court will generally not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal.1 A party cannot posit novel arguments on appeal unless
those arguments were appropriately presented before the lower court because then the
argument and issue are not ripe for appeal.
In their respective Briefs, Appellees raise multiple arguments that were never
presented to the district court and/or were never considered or made part of the district
court's final ruling.2 Specifically, UTA devotes approximately half of its Brief arguing that

1

See UTA Brief, p. 17. As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue,
including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court
committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. State p. Brown, 853 P.2d
851 (Utah 1992); State p. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987). The purpose of requiring
a properly presented objection is to "put[ ] the judge on notice of the asserted error and
allow[ ] the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." Broberg
p. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.1989). The trial court is considered "the proper forum
in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis" of issues. State p. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268, 1273 (Utah App.1990) (requiring defendants to introduce their request for state
constitutional interpretation before the trial court). Failing to argue an issue and present
pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial court "the opportunity to make any findings
of fact or conclusions of law" pertinent to the claimed error. LeBaron <& Assoc, v. Rebel Enter.,
823 P.2d 479, 483 n. 6 (Utah App.1991) (discussing Turtle Management, Inc. p. Haggis
Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982)).
2
As explained in Appellant's brief in chief, the April 23, 2007 Order [R. 174-179] contains
the only substantive legal analysis of the District Court on the issues presented by the
parties.
1
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rather than "legislative" action.3 Appellee Draper

City also relies upon this same argument 4 However, the April 23, 2007 Order [R. 174-179] is
devoid of any analysis of this question.
Draper City's Memorandi mi In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (which served as the principal basis for the
analysis contained in the district court's April _ \ J

M
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argument \\i. I'Hi l ( > n |''I )raper City** * «ta 1 argument was based on the premise that
Resolution not referable because Resolution 06-71 was only "advisory" in nature, not because
it was an administrative resolution. [See April 4, 200/ Hearing"! r.rou'jpi

• •» •

i ;• = .. ^ ; ;

disirin i ( M ii:t did ni »i address i Iu ",l administrative vs. legislative" dichotomy in any ruling or
decision, Appellant did not address this issue in its initial Brief.
UTA argues that because Appellant ,nu not make any argi lment in its Brief oi i th is
pjiLv .;.i? issue, Appcn-..

. ••• : concede in favor of Appellees.6 Such an assertion is illogical

because the matter was never argued at the district court, nor did the district court discuss
this distinction. Therefore, Appellant cannot be blamed for not raising it in their initial
Brief.
Obviously, this Court may remand the question to the district court for a
determination as to whether Resoli ition 06 71 is an administratis e act of tl le city coi mc.il
rather than a legislative one—which remand would allow the parties to fully represent their

3

UTA Brief, pp. 6-12.
Draper City Brief, pp. 9-12.
5
UTA was not a party at the time
6
UTA Brief, pp. 14.
4

2

positions and to provide evidence7 in support of their position. However, to raise the issue
sua sponte on appeal is improper and as such, this Court should not decide whether
Resolution 06-71 is an administrative or a legislative act of the city council, but should focus
on the factual findings and legal conclusions of the district court and the appropriateness of
those findings and conclusions.
B,

Even if this Court determines the issue was properly preserved,
Resolution 06-71 is a legislative act.

If this court were to find the Appellees properly preserved the issue of Resolution 0671's status as either legislative or administrative, Appellant asserts that Resolution 06-71 is
clearly legislative. This Court has placed limitations on what actions of a city council qualify
for a referendum. See Keiglej v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939). The limitation is
that the referendum process is available to challenge legislative actions rather than
administrative actions. Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
In Keig/ey, this Court indicated legislative actions are those which create new law as
opposed to merely implementing existing law. 97 Utah at 69. The Ninth Circuit recendy
faced a similar determination and utili2ed a four factor test to determine whether an act
qualifies as legislative. Kaahumanu v. County ofMaui, 315 P.3d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 2003). The
four factors are: 1) whether the act involved ad hoc decision-making, 2) whether the action
applies [to] a few individuals or to the public at large, 3) whether the act is formally
legislative in nature, and 4) whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation." Id.
This four factor test is based on a United States Supreme Court decision which the Tenth
Circuit also follows. See Cleavingerv. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (U.S. 1985); Moore p. Gunnison

E.g. Evidence that public hearings were held before adoption of Resolution 06-71.
3

Valley Hosp., 310 F 3d 1 31 5 1320 (10th Or. 2002). The test is fully explored in Kaahmanu and
is more persuasive than the test elucidated in Keigley as it requires a court to do more than a
cursory analysis of the type of law passed.
.V K:h}hn» .... ;] wedding business petitioned the county for a conditional use permit
to allow it to conduct business (perform weddings) on the beach, 315 P.3d at 1218. The
county denied the application for a conditions: w i p<> • ;.

. u • :. MM •
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argued against the permission. Id. at 1220. Under the first Kaahmanu factor, the city council's
determination to grant or deny a conditional use permit was an ad hoc decision because it
was made on a case by case basis and because the "cot lseqi lences of each ind ividi lal perm it
<« •,"••?

I. r'\ uw legislative policy." Id. In applying the second factor, the Kaahmanu

court found that because the decision only affected the individual applying for the permit
rather than the
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'rhe city council's vote satisfied the requirement of the action being formally
legislative in nature, or the third Kaahmanu factor. 315 P.3d at 1223. The city council's
decision to deny the permit d id i lot affect tl le o\ erall pol tc) of the zoning ordinance i lor d id
it affect any budgetary concerns, or services provided to the city's residents and according
the to the fourth and final Kaahmanu factor was administrative in nature. > i l\.xi at I ~JA.
U l t i m o r n , UK- k.iJ'-///,i\
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application for a special use permit was administrative in nature. Id.
In applying the Kaahmanu factors, it is clear that Draper City's actions would be
deem«
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underlying legislative policy of zoning and placement of a large transportation system.

4

Secondly, the decision affects every citi2en in the Draper City rather than only affecting a
few individuals. Third, the nature of the decision was formally legislative as the council voted
and passed the resolution. Fourth, the Resolution does affect the overall policy of the City's
planning committee as the Resolution gives UTA the City's approval or preference for
where the Trax should be built.
C.

Resolution 06-71 is not shielded from Referendum based on this Court's
decision in Salt Lake on Track.

For purposes of this appeal, Appellant does not dispute the district court's factual
finding that Resolution 06-71 was not "based on state law or local law," but rather, the
Appellant challenges the legal conclusions of the district court based upon such findings.
The Appellee attempts to confuse the issue by asserting that this Court's decision in Salt
Lake on Track bars Resolution 06-71 from being referable. (See Brief of Appellee p. 8-9).
However, the resolution and facts at issue in Salt Lake on Track differ from the resolution
and facts of the instant case.
Resolution 06-71 is not similar to Resolution 73 at issue in Salt Lake on Track. Unlike
Resolution 06-71, Salt Lake on Track Resolution 73 was clearly enacted under the authority of
Utah State law because it cites to and incorporates the authority of Utah Code Ann. §§11-13101 - 314 (2007). See Salt Lake City Resolution 73 of 1996. Resolution 73 also details the
interaction between Salt Lake City and UTA regarding "Fixed Guideway Transit Corridor,"
"Bus Service Agreement," and the "Arts in Transit Agreement." Id. Resolution 06-71
however, is not the implementation of an agreement between Draper City and UTA.
Resolution 06-71 states a specific preference of where Draper City would like Trax to
establish operations. (See Draper City's Memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

5

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction p.8). The Appellant is not
attacking the ability of Draper City to make or implement an agreement with UTA, rather
Appellant wants to be able to voice an opinion with respect to the recommendation of
Draper City as to where Trax should run within the city itself and specifically to require the
city by referendum to follow a more traditional zoning model as the current Resolution
sends Trax though residential and recreational areas populated with small children.
Ironically Draper City cannot hide behind the claim of immunity when according to
the district court the action was not enacted under state or local law, therefore state and local
law cannot preclude a referendum from occurring, and does not allow immunity to apply.
D.

The District Court did not rule on whether the county clerks were
indispensable parties and thus the issue is not ripe for appeal.

An issue is not ripe for appeal when the district court has not had the opportunity to
make a ruling regarding the issue. See generally Redwood Gym v. Salt hake County Commission, 624
P.2d 1138,1148 (Utah 1981). Acquiescence by parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on
an appellate court, rather, there must be a final judgment (or an exception) to confer
jurisdiction on an appellate court. See Posner v. Equity Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2006 WL 496269
(UT. App. 2006).
The issue of whether the county clerks are indispensable parties has not been, and
was not, decided by the district court. Hence, the district court has not issued a ruling
determining the county clerks were indispensable parties. A review of the proceedings at the
district court level shows that the district court continued to hear the case and make
dispositive rulings without ever finding or requiring the addition of the county clerks as
parties. Particularly after it was shown that the city clerks were not the only persons to certify
6

the Referendum packets. In addition, Draper City only raised this concern once in its initial
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. [R. at 190-99]. The district court makes no mention of this issue in
its April 23, 2007 Order [R. 174-179]. Draper City failed to raise the issue at any time
thereafter. Accordingly, the question should be remanded for determination by the district
court. However, if this Court assumes jurisdiction over this issue, Appellants argue that the
county clerks do not qualify as necessary parties, let alone indispensable parties.
E.

The county clerks are not indispensable parties within the meaning of
Utah R. Civ. P. 19.

The district court made no finding that the county clerks were necessary parties or
that they were indispensable parties. However, an analysis of the law governing necessary
and indispensable parties requires a finding that the county clerks were neither necessary nor
indispensable parties. The Utah Rules of Civil procedure require joinder of a party under the
following circumstances:

A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties. . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 19. Prior to making a determination that a party is indispensable and
must be joined, the court must find that the party is necessary. Johnson v. Higley, 989
P.2d 61 (UT App. 1999) (certiorari denied, 994 P.2d 1271). A necessary party is one
that must be joined if there is any risk of inconsistent or double obligations without
the joinder of the party. Geisselv. Moore Med. Corp., 524 U.S. 74, 78 (1998). An
indispensable party is one that would not allow the present parties "complete relief5

7

without its presence in the lawsuit. Id. "[I]n determining whether a party is an
indispensable party who must be joined in an action, the court must ascertain
whether the party has sufficient interest in the action to make it a necessary party, and
second, whether joinder of the party is unfeasible, and in the absence of that party,
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed." Turvilk v. J &J
"Properties, L.C, 145 P.3d 1146 (UT App 2006) (rehearing denied, certiorari denied 153
P.3d 185).
An individual's mere involvement as an actor in a dispute does not
automatically make that individual an indispensable party. When a firefighter sued the
County Fire Civil Service Council for failing to give him a promotion, the Utah Court
of Appeals found that the fire chief was not an indispensable party to the action
despite the chiefs position of authority over the plaintiff. Cassidy v. Salt Lake City Fire
Civil Service Council, 976 P.2d 607 (UT App. 1999) (certiorari denied 982 P.2d 89). In
Cassidy, the fire chief originally failed to promote the plaintiff, but because the County
Civil Service Council had the ability to adjudicate the claim and make a binding
decision on the fire chief, it was unnecessary for him to be a party to the action. Id.
The plaintiff was able to gain complete relief without having the fire chief as a party
and therefore the fire chief was not required as a party. Id.
The Utah County Clerk and Salt Lake County Clerks are not necessary or
indispensable parties to this action. Like the fire chief in Cassidy, the county clerks are
bound by the decision of Draper City and this Court. Similar to the fire chief in
Cassidy who made the initial decision to deny the promotion, the county clerks in the

8

present case made certain initial determinations as to the acceptability and timeliness
of certain signatures. Nevertheless the clerks need not be sued in their individual
capacities for Appellants to obtain the "complete relief sought A mere footnote in
the district court's April 30, 2007 ruling is not a sufficient basis for alleging that the
county clerks were indispensable parties.8
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing this Court should reverse the District Court's grant of Draper
City's Motion to Dismiss and remand the case for determination as to the remaining issues
before the district court
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ ^ a a y of February, 2008
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Attorneys for Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

8

See Draper City Brief, p. 15.
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